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This paper explores the complex semiotic entanglement between discourse, ideology and practical 
application surrounding the neoliberal welfare policy known as workfare. It focuses particularly on 
the Flexible New Deal - the version of workfare trialled in the UK from 2009 to 2010 under New 
Labour. The Flexible New Deal was a privately administered, for-profit, payment-by-results 
scheme which made receipt of welfare benefits conditional upon reciprocal activity – in particular, 
attendance at workfare centres for “re-training”. This paper provides a Marxist-semiotic analysis of 
an actual Flexible New Deal centre, based on participant observation in 2010. This is framed within 
a wider analysis which proposes that an economic undercode dialectically interacts with class-racist 
ideology to semiotically sculpt the victims of structural unemployment into an apparent culture of 
pathological dysfunction – a theatrical illusion which nevertheless renders each unemployed person 
victim to a mendacious “rhyming up” with media folk-devils. In conclusion, this paper argues that 
via the term “underclass”, individual states of poverty are transformed into the perception of a 
socially-cancerous, welfare funded, expanding state (i.e. nation) within the State. This elision of 
personal and plural, and transubstantiation of the processes of poverty into people, is marked by the 
novel signifier “s/State”.  
  
1.   Introduction 
1.1.   The UK’s shift to workfare 
In 2009 the UK’s New Labour government trialled a welfare scheme – the Flexible New 
Deal (FND) – ostensibly designed to re-insert the long-term unemployed (those 
unemployed for over one year) back into the labour market (Daguerre, 2004). While FND 
was cancelled in 2010 (replaced in 2011 by the almost identical Work Programme) it 
nevertheless marked a profound shift in UK social policy, rendering the old social-
democratic aim of ameliorating the ravages of structural unemployment (Esping-
Anderson, 1990) largely obsolete, and introducing a new, neoliberal ideology – ‘do 
something about the feckless unemployed’ – to mask the deliberate expansion of the 
numbers of people cast into the ‘reserve labour army’.2 
                                                          
1 Email: john.d.jordan@stu.mmu.ac.uk 
2 In Marxist economic theory, the reserve labour army is a pool of unemployed individuals whose presence in 
the labour market both disciplines the employed through fear of the sack, and also drags down wage values, 
thus increasing the profitability of capitalist enterprises. 
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1.2.   Introducing the anathattractive s/State 
In this paper I engage workfare from a Marxist-semiotic perspective. As such, I not only 
explore the empirical realities of such programmes, I also locate these within the wider 
structural, class, economic and discursive frameworks that generate the semiotic “theatre” 
in which the victims of structural unemployment are made to carry, symbolically, the 
blame for global economic catastrophe. I argue that the primary trajectory of workfare is 
the semiotic re-casting of the poor and unemployed as a pathological social limb that is 
illegitimately consuming resources belonging to “real” society. This, I propose, is 
achieved by a discursive legerdemain which elides the personal “state” of poverty with 
the sense of a growing, cancerous state within the State – the so-called underclass. I mark 
this elision with the sign “s/State”. I argue that, once seconded to this s/State, individuals 
“attract” anathematisation via a media-inspired false-association with all other people in 
that s/state - most especially well-known media demons. This, I term the “anathattractive 
s/State”.  
 While this process begins in the discourse of the wider arenas of neoliberal 
political-economy and the Right-leaning mass media, and draws upon the long-standing 
ideological distinction between the “deserving” and “underserving” poor criticised for 
centuries as a specious defamation of the victims of structural poverty (see Hazlitt, 1807; 
Mill, 1808; Marx, 1887; Piven and Cloward, 1971; Bourdieu, 1998), this study 
demonstrates how, within a workfare centre, the anathattractive s/State becomes 
performative, as individuals are subjected to disciplinary regimes that mortify, destroy 
morale, encourage hopelessness and prompt either surly non-cooperation or self-
incriminating admissions of failure.  
1.3.   Situating the study – dialectic economics, performative ideology 
While exploring workfare centres semiotically has been suggested programmatically by 
Goldberg (2001), that author’s conception of benefits claimants being “wrapped” in 
symbols of profanity remains speculative (it is not clear, for example, how one would 
operationalise “profanity”) and primarily located within the realm of discourse. In 
contrast, I explore how the economic realities of workfare centres – particularly their 
woeful underfunding caused by bidding too low for payments-by-results contracts – 
create physical semiosis, such as group compression effects, defeatist body language and 
dressage performances through ritualised control. That workfare responds to wider 
neoliberal economic imperatives has also been proposed, signally, by Peck (2002) and 
Jessop (1993), who contend that workfare is intended to create docile, cheap, disciplined 
workers. However, in contrast, I demonstrate that while the “dull compulsion of the 
economic” (Marx, 1887: 516) drives the fundamental operations of a workfare centre, this 
is continually dialectically conditioned by the ideology of the “feckless prole”, which 
downloads into staff attitudes, provider training materials and centre programmes from 
wider class-racist discourses. This does not create disciplined, docile workers; it forces 
internees – through threats of “sanction” (loss of benefits) and oppressive techniques of 
group management – to “perform” the role of feckless prole. As workfare centres 
inevitably fail in their primary official remit of forcing social categories unwanted by the 
labour market back into work, workfare centre staff psychologically re-task themselves as 
“social nurses” who, tell themselves that they are at least doing something to give 
structure and discipline to the lives of the feckless unemployed. This allows workfare 
centre staff to pretend that the meaningless programmes which they administer are 
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actually a useful form of therapy. This new mutation of the centre’s underpinning 
dialectic is itself then re-conditioned by the dull compulsion of the economic as staff find 
that a patronising social nursing regime demoralises the internees, rendering their ever 
growing numbers easier to control. I make no argument as to the ultimate purposes of this 
social event; I only note that once the illusion of the anathattractive s/State has been 
established in the wider public consciousness, the unemployed become vulnerable to a 
wide range of potential trajectories. My exploration of these processes, furthermore, 
demonstrates how the often overwhelmingly complex-seeming vicissitudes of neoliberal 
globalisation can be directly connected to micro-level semiotics. For example, a workfare 
internee with hands placed over his face in utter desperation as he experiences the 
mortifying humiliation of being ordered to be positive, is not an isolated event, but the 
obverse of a vast reorganisation in the global economy. This programmatic reconnection 
of semiotics and political economy marks, firstly, a shift beyond the all too common 
tendency to view the ideology surrounding the “underclass” and benefits claimants solely 
in terms of the discursive and symbolic. As Anderson (1983) notes, this tendency falsely 
obscures the conditioning importance of the economic. Secondly, this study draws back 
from the other extreme – the approaches of, signally, Bourdieu (2005, 1998) and Skeggs 
(2004), which present virtually all aspects of society and culture in terms of “capitals” 
and “values” spent within “symbolic economies” for “symbolic profits”. That approach, 
as Archer (1989) points out, just as effectively eliminates the meaning, and therefore 
independent significance, of the economic. This study will, in contrast, mark a 
reaffirmation, and demonstration, of the validity and importance of an economics based, 
Marxist semiotics. 
1.4.   Flexible New Deal, workfare and disciplinary flexploitation 
FND was a form of workfare. In simplest terms, workfare is a social policy that makes 
the receipt of unemployment benefits conditional upon the performance of mandatory 
reciprocal activity (“conditionality” in welfare jargon). Conditionality usually, but not 
exclusively, encompasses compulsory attendance at workfare centres, re-training, 
caseworker interviews, lifestyle coaching, job-search, and sometimes mandatory work 
experience (Peck, 2001; Quaid, 2002). In 2008, the same year that a UK government 
report on foreign workfare schemes concluded that they were ineffective and 
prohibitively expensive (Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2008), UK 
government minister Peter Mandelson argued that: [the] welfare-to-work programme 
[workfare] makes the labour market flexible […] It increases the supply of labour in the 
economy, its quality and its employability” (Dostal, 2008: 28). In one sense, workfare can 
thus be viewed as part of the ongoing neoliberalisation of the UK’s labour force towards 
what Bourdieu (1998: 85) has described as “flexploitation”. Flexploitation means the 
restructuring of work into wage-regimes which aggressively emaciate much of the sub-
elite labour market’s rights, wage-values, contracted hours and welfare benefits (Peck, 
2001; Gorz, 1989). Flexploitation also means the installation of psychologically 
oppressive disciplinary working conditions – including the looming threat of workfare if 
fired (Harvey, 2011; Dumenil and Levy, 2004; Peck, 2001). However, the term neoliberal 
is misleading here. Arguments such as Mandelson’s are based on neo-classical 
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equilibrium theory which proposes that unemployment would mostly disappear if wages 
dropped low enough to allow entrepreneurs to employ more people (Deane, 1978). This is 
not new. Nor is it correct: Keynesianism, for example, was constructed upon an empirical 
analysis of the phenomenon of low wages and mass unemployment walking, miserably, 
hand in hand (Keynes, 1997). It is more accurate to say that workfare is an atavistic return 
to the old liberal ideology of disciplinary workhouses espoused by Bentham (2010 
[1796], 1843) and Mill (1998 [1859]), combined with modern psycho-social theories of 
poverty and unemployment. The latter argue, variously, that welfare destroys self-esteem, 
retards active job-seeking, and corrupts entire locales by generating a welfare dependent, 
generationally transmitted, pathological underclass (see Kennedy, 1962; Moynihan, 1965; 
Nozick, 1974; Gilder, 1982; Murray, 1984, 1996; Mead, 1986, 2005; Wax, 2005; 
Schwartz, 2005). Thus, Bentham’s intellectual descendent Lawrence Mead recommends 
workfare as a form of disciplinary socialisation capable of “dissolving” the “welfare 
class” (1986: 139). Again, however, while labour discipline has been widely proposed as 
a key marker of neoliberalism (see e.g. Overbeek and Pijl, 1993; Wacquant, 2010), Ernest 
Mandel (1971) explains convincingly that labour re-disciplining recurs regularly over 
capitalism’s long sprawl. It is not, in other words, very neo. The primary goal of such 
intensified labour discipline is always to expand and control the reserve labour army in 
order to underpin a resurgence in capitalist profitability (ibid.).   
 It is not within the scope or intent of this paper to debunk the economics of 
workfare. Suffice to say that, as a means of moving the long-term unemployed off 
welfare and back into employment, it has been a spectacular failure (see e.g. DWP, 2008; 
Quaid, 2002; Sunley et al., 2001; Brett, 2003; Hohmeyer and Wolff, 2012; Kreiner et al., 
2005; Peck, 2001, 1998; Piven, 1998; Bane and Ellwood, 1994). However, success is a 
malleable term. Capitalist poor relief has always demonstrated an impressive capacity to 
grow new veins from which to speciously extract ideological legitimacy and purpose. 
Primary amongst these, I argue below, is the pretence of acting as a socio-medical barrier 
against the cancer of the poor (cf. Douglas, 1969), and it is this conceit, and its semiotic 
manufacture, which forms the bulk subject of this paper.  
1.5.   Structure of the paper 
Section two of this paper outlines the broad semiotic frame which downloads into a 
workfare centre. This, as might be expected from a Marxist analysis, proposes not one 
semiotic view, but a struggle between differential class-based perspectives over the 
interpretation of the same sign-set. Section three adumbrates the first of these views – the 
ontology of late capitalism – outlining its structure and purpose. Section three outlines a 
Marxist response to this ontology. The fourth section engages the idea that workfare 
constitutes an amplification of pre-extant class-racist prejudices, and presents some novel 
conceptual tools with which to engage this defamation-game. Section five is an analysis 
of the semiotic-regime prosecuted in an actual FND centre. This is based on my direct 
experiences of working in the centre for a few weeks in 2010. The centre, and FND, are 
long defunct. However, based on extensive subsequent research I draw parallels with 
workfare more generally. The sixth section provides a concluding discussion in which I 
argue that workfare is a horrific exercise in waste management as art, the ultimate 
outcome of which cannot be fully known until it emerges in real time from the dialectical 
interaction between economic and class-racist “codes”.  
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2.   A Marxist semiotics  
2.1.   Detecting macro-economics in micro-semiosis 
This study draws on three broad streams: Marxism, semiotics and symbolic 
interactionism – particularly the work of Erving Goffman. While at first these may seem 
disparate analytic threads, praxis begs to differ (see also Goldberg, 2001). Like workfare, 
neoliberal globalisation (workfare’s economic parent system) is too often viewed 
primarily in terms of gross and abstract international forces and flows. While these latter 
are undoubtedly immensely significant, immensity itself can sometimes obscure the 
micro-fabric of neoliberal reality – i.e. the other business end of neoliberalism, where real 
individuals experience “the virtue of selfishness” (Rand, 1964) – as its victims. This study 
is concerned with the semiotic echoes that occur at micro-social levels subsequent to the 
movement of vast, global, economic eddies; and more particularly, how one key 
neoliberal apparatus – a workfare centre – acts as an amplification chamber for these 
reverberations. A workfare centre can have multiple purposes, depending on local 
political, geographical, economic and labour market imperatives. However, it always has 
the purpose of symbolically reprocessing its inmates into the cruelly and unjustifiably 
individualised destination of neoliberal blame-download.  
 Blame-download – i.e. making the victims of poverty appear to be to blame for 
their plight – is accomplished via aggressive semiotic regimes. These regimes, cannot, 
however, be separated from the immensity of the world-market. They exist solely as 
defamatory semio-disciplinary appliances in its service. Hence, to facilitate analysis, an 
innovative and creative schema is required that is capable of detecting the echoes of the 
financial big-bang (neoliberalism) in the cultural radiation (class-racism (Balibar, 1992)) 
leaked by workfare centres. Marx’s work remains the primary and most profoundly 
incisive guide to the operation of the world-market and poor law operation today. 
Workfare, in many ways, takes every dire warning Marx made as to the oppression of the 
unemployed, and of the exploitation of low paid workers, and treats them not as a 
warning of what to avoid, but as a blueprint for what to do. There is nothing, furthermore, 
in the profound analytic over-view bequeathed by Marx which forbids linking macro-
forces to semio-disciplinary regimes. Quite the reverse: Marx himself details extensively 
the micro-discipline and discursive defamations prosecuted historically against paupers 
(1887, 1975a [1865]). Nor is the work of Erving Goffman somehow incompatible with 
macro-structural views. Goffman was acutely aware of the impact of wider economic 
processes upon individual ‘treatments’ (see especially Stigma) – and particularly the 
double-meaning of this word (see Asylums), which takes on a further level of significance 
in a neoliberal world where not only structurally engendered life-distress, but also 
poverty, is seen as a treatable, quasi-medical personal dysfunction (see, signally, Mead, 
1986). 
 Between them, Marx and Goffman provide a basis for exploring workfare as a site 
of disciplinary semio-techniques, in Foucault’s (1991) term. However, the Marxist 
semiotic element of this schema requires some further elaboration.  
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2.2.   Multiaccentuality 
Too often, social semiotics (see Leeuwen, 2005) over-privileges the theorist’s reading of 
a sign. The very word “reading”, in this sense, implies an embedded semiosis which a 
properly literate academic “transcribes”. Reading also implies – correctly – distance. 
However, to read a sign is quite different to being viscerally entangled with it, in situ. 
Eminent Marxist semiotician Velentin Volosinov argues (1986: 23) that signs possess 
“multiaccentuality”. This means that different social classes engage the same sign, or 
collections of signs, from differential economic situations, thus experiencing them very 
differently. “Situation” within signs, from a Marxist perspective, is thus not merely a 
privileged reading of meanings, but an affective and class-based entanglement with them. 
It is more accurate, then, to speak not of reading signs, but of experiencing an entangled 
situation within what I will call ‘sign-theatres’ – i.e. presence within collections of signs 
that are drawn into a perceptual interconnection due to one’s relation to them both 
experientially and performatively. The theorist’s view is only one possible sign-theatre 
constructible from the available symbolic parataxis. We might also now add that different 
intersections of class, ethnicity, age, sexuality, ability and gender also colour not only 
sign-reading, but sign entanglement. There may be, in other words, multitudinous 
different sign-theatres being constructed out of any one situation according to differing 
personal assessments of, and sensitivities to, potential, implied or obscured semiosis. One 
might watch these, as an audience, or, in gradual degree, experience them, as an 
increasingly entangled participant. Each unique position imparts a different semiotic 
resonance. 
 However, while perspectives sensitive to social intersection are valuable, the 
current trend in the humanities towards intersectionality theory – which seeks to locate 
each individual within a complex, ever finer-grained nexus of cross-referenced social 
categories (see Hunter and De Simone, 2009) – is simply too coincidentally kindred to 
neoliberal ideology in that it reduces social complexity to individuals. Individualisation, 
as Bourdieu (1998) notes, makes it far easier for neoliberal regimes to present poverty 
and unemployment as self-authored. Following Engels
3 
(1976) [1886] I view this as, 
ultimately, not politically empowering, but de-politicising, due to fragmentation and de-
solidarisation – the very processes which, I will argue below, neoliberalism prosecutes 
via workfare centres. Consequently, following Volosinov, I propose that it is far more 
analytically and politically useful to view two broad sign-theatres as operating in a 
workfare centre: a proletarian one and a bourgeois one. To this is added the third: mine, 
the theorist’s.  
 The theorist’s interpretation still has an important role to play: “false 
consciousness” occurs just as easily at the semiotic level as any other.4 The very fact of a 
chasm existing between proletarian and bourgeois sign-reading means that there is a role 
for someone with an overview of both perspectives. The role of the – Marxist – semiotic 
                                                          
3 Presciently, Engels makes the point that it is difficult to get anything done politically if everyone focuses on 
their own issue rather than on what we each have in common. 
4 According to Marxist theory, the underpinning processes of capitalism are, generally speaking, so complex 
and involved that individuals are often unaware of how these actually function, or why they themselves live 
in particular social and economic circumstances, or see things in particular ways. This is a “false 
consciousness” of the real productive relations within a society.  
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theorist is to reveal the sign-theatres in use in a field, to attempt to relate how it feels to be 
entangled within them, and also to reveal the extent of those entanglements with wider 
economic reality. 
2.3.   Neoliberalism’s Tenant  
Following Marcuse (1963) I view neoliberalism as an aggressive project of ontological 
re-structuration intended to embed the principles of self-interest and methodological 
individualism into every aspect of social, economic and cultural practice. Of the many 
socially corrosive effects that this process leads to, one is signally concerning: the re-
structuration of consciousness itself. Volosinov (1986: 13) argues that “individual 
consciousness is not the architect of [the] ideological superstructure, but only a tenant 
lodging in the social edifice of ideological signs”. Contrary to the standard Western 
metaphysic of a fixed, indivisible self, soul or ‘spirit being’, Volosinov posits 
consciousness as the fluid and changeable product of a dialectic interaction with signs; 
and signs themselves as carrying ideological loads drawn from wider economic 
parameters. In the case of workfare, this constitutes a sustained attempt to re-form 
proletarian consciousnesses, generating a new, capitalism-friendly psychological tenant – 
a bourgeois puppet-mind (the micro-version of a neoliberal puppet government). 
 This puppet-mind is an epistemological configuration designed to form 
unemployment paraphernalia into a sign-theatre of personal, not structural failure. If the 
unemployed can be made to accept this blame, they are both disappeared and also (at 
least temporarily) demoralised and depoliticised. The iconic example of this psycho-
pathological entanglement is the attempt to convince everyone that structural 
unemployment is due to low self-esteem, i.e. due to a psychological malaise that retards 
efforts to seek work (see for example Layard et al., 1994). Whereas, a more radical - and 
accurate - interpretation of the same sign-theatre will see, rather, low morale, which is an 
exasperation with the situation. The difference between these two is one of blame locus – 
i.e. where the responsibility for unemployment lies, in the system, or the individual. This 
is no coincidence; it is a fractal iteration of capitalism’s foundation episteme: the erasure 
of awareness of the socio-economic totality, and the radical foregrounding of the isolated 
social unit (Lukacs, 1971). 
3.   The epistemology of bourgeois rhetoric 
3.1.   The “underclass” 
A benefits claimant arrives at a workfare centre already the victim of aggressive negative 
signification. In Kafkaesque fashion, claimants wake up, not one day, but gradually, to 
the realisation that they are being transformed into social vermin: feckless, lazy, chav, 
scrounger, sponger, layabout and even “scum” (Littlejohn, 2008). These are special kinds 
of words. They are not only ideological in content, but also in form. As Marcuse (1963) 
notes, there is a way of (ab)using language – which we may broadly designate the 
capitalist episteme – that greases capital interests by locking ontological focus at the 
micro level, i.e. on the unit. This “focus-lock” distracts attention from – indeed 
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anaesthetises – awareness of the systemic, macro-economic processes of exploitation that 
structure late capitalism (Jameson, 1991). This process has evolved (experienced a 
conditioning “functional selection” in Cohen’s (1978) term) to aggressively sedate any 
implication of class exploitation, via a linguistic transubstantiation of macro level process 
into micro-level dysfunctionality – or, in the case of wealth, hardworking 
entrepreneurialism (see e.g. Donlan, 2008; Bhagwati, 2004). This is a species of magic 
trick, and the product is a linguistic alchemy which, falsely and bizarrely, allows a 
process to become a human being. 
 The effect is bedazzling. Social policy theorist Gary Bryner (1998: 48), for 
example, states that “The underclass is the most intense manifestation of urban poverty”. 
The magic here is nearly literal: poverty, which is a state and, within late capitalism, the 
direct product of economic processes, “manifests” itself as people. This rhetorical 
transubstantiation of process into people, once performed, actively resits re-constitution 
into the truth: the trick was brief, effective, and easy to believe, but the rebuttal – Marxist 
theory – is complex, apparently tedious, and contrary to wider class-racist prejudices. 
And so the momentum of re-signification continues on, fallaciously transforming 
poverty-generating processes into personal dysfunction, failure or moral lack.  
 This magic trick is the base-conceit of workfare, but the perception it generates is 
already groomed into workfare centre staff by wider media and political discourse, long 
before they commence work at the centre. It is part of the miasma of late capitalism. The 
capitalist episteme aggressively functionally selects terms which can be used to talk of 
aggregates of individuals; terms that both emit class-racism, and yet also maintain a 
desperate focus-lock on the individual, not class (or heavens forbid structural) level. 
Scrounger and sponger, for example, can become scroungers and spongers to signify and 
defame the growing numbers of poor unemployed, and yet never imply anything other 
than a (swelling) collection of dysfunctional, lazy individuals. This is the foundation, and 
greatest achievement, of bourgeois class rhetoric. Its latest, more evolved iteration, is the 
media pseudo-signifier “underclass” (Gans, 1995). Althusser (1971: 5) states that some 
words are “the site of an ambiguity: the stake in a decisive but undecided battle.” 
Underclass is very much one such battleground. For some Marxist writers, such as Wright 
(1997), the underclass is simply that group which is most utterly the victim of capital 
exclusion, whose labour power is worth exactly nil. Other scholars, such as Bauman 
(2000) and Pakulski and Waters (1996), however, have argued oxymoronically that 
although social class is – to them – no longer a valid sociological concept, nevertheless 
there still exists an “underclass”. The effect of this word-game is the pseudo-erasure of 
class antagonism, as, drawing on Marx’s (1975b) famous distinction between classes in, 
and classes for themselves, this leaves the underclass as, curiously, a class by itself, with 
no sense of how it got there. This opens a space for Right-leaning academics, politicians 
and the journalists to supply their own underclass creation myth: that it is self-authored 
through dysfunctional behaviour. This conceit has not become part of the capitalist 
episteme, however, through clear explanations of what the underclass “is”, but primarily 
through the exploitation of a linguistic confusion; particularly so in the media. While 
lurid tales of “underclass” dysfunction generally employ the word formally as a noun 
signifying a group of people - for example in The Spectator’s headline The Philpott case 
should prompt debate about Britain’s underclass (Murray, 2013) – its actual meaning is 
usually drawn, liminally, and simultaneously, from its sense as an adjective signifying the 
dysfunctional activities of the subject of the story – in this case of Mick Philpott, whose 
botched arson accidentally burned several of his children to death. In a blurring of 
singular and plural almost too subtle to register, the individual media demon is presented 
as the underclass. His or her activities supply the adjectival meaning of “underclass”, 
while the word’s double sense as a plural noun speciously projects that individual’s guilt 
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onto the wider poor. The point of this process is to “vanish” the poor and the unemployed 
by associating indigence with perverse cultural mores (see e.g. Gilder, 1982; Murray, 
1984). In this Devil’s arithmetic, the medium is not the message, but the fact-
manipulating massage.  
4.   A Marxist-semiotic response 
4.1.   Anathattractive states 
Marx characterised the ideological attacks launched by the bourgeoisie against the 
working classes as class anathematisation. Work by social policy theorist David Byrne 
(2005) is useful here in constructing a Marxist semiotic response to this phenomenon. 
Drawing on some concepts from quantum mechanics, Byrne proposes that life trajectories 
might be mapped over time to reveal how certain personal circumstantial configurations 
tend to be “attractors” of certain economic states. For example, a single, 25 year old 
female from a poor background with a small child to care for is in a “state” that is very 
likely to “attract” poverty. Of course, Byrne does not mean in any way that such a person 
is responsible for the poverty they attract, but merely that a certain set of attributes 
renders them more likely to become a victim of peculiar structural and social injustices. 
This is true. We can usefully extend this idea to argue that certain states can attract certain 
forms of pariahisation. A poor female head of household, for example, exists in a peculiar 
[what I will label, fusing the words anathematisation and attraction] anathattractive state, 
obnoxiously targeted by media, academic and political victimisers.  Variations in a poor 
person’s life-facts can vary their anathattractive state. A poor female head of household, 
for example, might be moved to a municipal estate, and so draw the bizarre opprobrium 
so often directed against social housing tenants (Bourdieu, 2005; Jones and Novak, 1999).  
 Condemnation to an anathattractive state re-situates an individual. Signs become 
re-signified via the intermediation of this prejudicial social prism. But while this is a very 
personal fate, the process also rhymes its victims. This does not occur via a “levelling-
down” of all attractors to an average of the total. Rather, as Marx (1975b [1847]) 
explains, one extreme factor is often over-emphasised so that it comes to osmote (in this 
case unjustifiably negative) signification to all of the others. Exceptional cases of indigent 
dysfunction, real or imagined, thus spring into media, and then public discourse, acting as 
mass-markers for the wider poor. Through a curious process of “referent fade”, individual 
media demons – such as Alfie Patten, John Watkinson and Tracey Connelly - exist as 
individuals only ephemerally, before disseminating to become mass-markers of social 
collapse: the 13 year old dad, the millionaire benefit fraudster and even more vaguely, 
Baby P (Jones, 2011).
5
 Individuals semiotically expand into categories. Baby P comes to 
                                                          
5 In 2009 Alfie Patten was – falsely – identified by the British media as the 13 year old father of a baby. 
Various newspapers picked up the story and ran with it, with The Telegraph signally exploiting the tale – 
whilst simultaneously accusing the Pattens of exploiting it – using it to signify the current UK underclass 
buzz-concept of ‘broken Britain’; even extending its disgust to Alfie’s father, accusing him of also 
exemplifying broken Britain for having too many children (Woods, 2009). David Cameron commented on 
Alfie that “That's what's gone wrong and we've got to put it right” BBC (2009: 1), while Iain Duncan Smith 
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stand for Baby-prole (Black, 2008), and any welfare funded “sprawling council estate” 
child thus becomes, potentially, a pitiable victim-in-waiting of the “feral underclass” – 
and a potential new member of it (see e.g. West, 2009). As a signal example, Iain Duncan 
Smith (2008: 1) states of the horrific Baby P murder that “Dysfunctional family life lies at 
the heart of the problem”. Both singular and plural are embedded in this statement. 
Applied in the singular, to the child’s family, this is a glib understatement. But it is 
worded so mendaciously that it pseudo-pluralises, tarring a much wider, unconnected 
social group with guilt. Meanwhile, as Jones (2011) notes, the astonishing rareness of 
these cases, or instances of bourgeois equivalents, are largely omitted from class-racist 
political and media propaganda. 
 An anathattractive state is thus not merely a vulnerability to such ideological bile, 
but to these categorisations, and to a false and unjustifiable rhyming-up with a category’s 
most infamous mass-markers. The concept of a broken society, which can only be 
achieved via this process of mendacious social rhyming, has been explicitly deployed by 
both Tony Blair (1997) and David Cameron (2009) to justify welfare “reform”. This, in 
harmony with continued contrasting references to “hard working families” (Wheeler 
2005) marks a sharp return to age-old attempts to split the poor unemployed faction of the 
working classes from the poor working faction (Handler, 1995); a resurgence described 
by Westergaard (1995: 118) as “the attrition of citizenship”.  
4.2.   Prolemes and fecklemes 
Mendacious rhyming is nothing new. And nor is it peculiar to welfare claimants: poor 
people have been subjected to obnoxious propaganda for centuries – indeed, millennia 
(see Exodus 5). However, under industrial capitalism, historically, this has been 
prosecuted by ideologically fragmenting the proletariat into multiple mythological 
“units”, such as the politically dangerous, the thuggish, the overbreeding, the lazy, the 
uncouth, the stupid, the unclean, the diseased and the intoxicated. And also, occasionally, 
the decent and the loyal, where this serves capital interests. Just as Levi-Strauss describes 
the “units” of myths as being drawn from archetypal bundles known as “mythemes” 
(Hawkes, 1977: 44), so I describe these categorisations as “prolemes” – or mythological 
units of “prole”. Bourgeois poor-law mythology focuses on its own sub-category of 
proleme, however: what I will term the “feckleme”, or mythological unit of feckless 
prole.  
 Fecklemes include most of the general categories of proleme (omitting some, such 
as the politically dangerous), albeit refined into well-rhymed categories, such as “unwed 
                                                                                                                                                               
stated that Alfie’s case “exemplified the point we have been making about broken Britain” (ibid.). It later 
emerged that Alfie wasn’t the father at all. However, by then, ‘the 13 year old father’ had become an iconic 
signifier of ‘broken Britain’ all the same.  
John Watkinson was a company director who falsely claimed over £118,000 in benefits. The Daily Mail 
claimed that he lived a “millionaire lifestyle” – this despite him not actually stealing “millions”. 
Nevertheless, the notion that the ranks of benefits claimants are stocked with cheats living the highlife has 
become a key weapon in the ideological war against the poor that is known as “welfare reform”.  
Tracey Connelly was convicted of allowing her partner Steven Barker and his brother Jason, to torture her 
17 month old son Peter to death in horrific circumstances in 2007. This exceptional case was cynically used 
by right-wing British media to attack the wider poor, with, as signal example, Daily Mail journalist Helen 
Weathers stating that “Of course, nothing can ever excuse the unspeakable cruelty of Baby P's mother. But 
this harrowing Mail investigation lays bare how society's amoral and brutalised underclass breeds such 
monsters” (Weathers 2009). Iain Duncan Smith (2008: 1), meanwhile, exemplifying the bizarre fusion of 
singular and plural discussed in the above article, argued of the case that “Dysfunctional family life lies at 
the heart of the problem”. While that is an astonishing understatement when referring to baby Peter’s actual 
family, it is intended to refer – outrageously – to the wider poor, who did not murder the child. 
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mother” or “feckless father”. However, unlike the average proleme, fecklemes are 
perceived to have committed a state-crime (in both senses, i.e. against the state and being 
in a personal state) under capitalism: i.e. allowing their dysfunction to keep them from 
the wage-labour market. The point of workfare, at least on one level, is to publicly 
anathematise them for this state-crime. As Marx (1887) notes, this is partly to provide a 
salient, disciplinary warning to others, and partly to mask the realities of structural 
unemployment – particularly its immense value to capitalism - behind a mendacious 
propaganda campaign. 
4.3.   The proaretic code and the undercode 
Workfare operates on two levels, however – or rather, according to two codes – which 
clash and intermesh dialectically. The first of these is what Barthes (1988: 139) describes 
as a bourgeois “proairetic” code; that is, a code of narrative actions which implies a 
journey from inferior proletarian, to superior bourgeois, lifestyles and values. An 
excellent example is supplied by Stockport Council. As a council tenant I regularly 
receive letters from them emblazoned with the letterhead Stockport Homes: Transforming 
Lives. The implication of course is that the lives of council house tenants require 
transformation. The proairetic code, similarly, in-forms the ideology of workfare 
institutions. The second code – which I will call the “undercode” – is what, in more 
proper, Marxist terminology, is known as the dull compulsion of economic reality. The 
undercode grooms the actual operating practices of workfare centres. In the following 
section I will draw on the conceptual tools outlined thus far to explore how these two 
codes interact in a real workfare centre. 
5.   The semiotics of actually existing workfare 
5.1.   Introduction 
This section will present a case study based on just over four weeks of participant 
observation in a private FND centre – anonymised simply as the Centre – in 2010. During 
that time I worked as a member of staff, ostensibly on a trial period basis, and 
participated in all of the major activities of the Centre. In addition to fieldwork 
observation, I conducted numerous discussions with staff and internees as to their 
opinions and feelings about the Centre and its operations.  
5.2.   The Centre 
Welfare claimants interned at workfare centres are known as clients. As Goffman (1961) 
notes of this curious abuse of term, the internee is actually the thing brought in to be 
fixed; the real client is the authorities. And this is precisely how the staff at the Centre 
view the benefits claimants seconded to their institution: as fecklemes of various species 
captured on their “sprawling council estates” by welfare officials and brought in for 
reprocessing into “decent”, functional beings. Not workers – because the staff rapidly 
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realise that that is prevented by the undercode (i.e. lack of available jobs) – but, as a 
second best, into decent people. This, however, is an example of what Sartre (2004: 162) 
termed counter-finality: i.e. the institutional conceit of attempting to make internees 
decent is the hidden mechanism via which they are semiotically constructed as indecent. 
Condemnation to a workfare centre, in other words, marks descent into a profound 
anathattractive state: once in, every aspect of one’s reprocessing is designed to attract 
evidence of belonging there. 
 Clients first arrive at the Centre – a small, cheap office suite in a multi-story office 
block in a medium sized British town - following the receipt of a “welcoming letter”, 
oxymoronically inviting them in for a compulsory induction. The Centre runs three such 
inductions a week, on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, with each induction attended 
by 15-20 new clients. These have been sent here by the job centre, and must comply on 
pain of financial sanction.  
 Clients arrive one at a time, as individuals – but the processing logic of the Centre 
is a fractalised replication of the concept underclass with its peculiar elision of singular 
and plural, and so arrival is merely the commencement of a process of “negative 
individualisation”. This, the real-life corollary of Libertarianism’s version of “negative 
liberty” (leaving people alone to make a profit) (Berlin, 1958) means the counter-intuitive 
aggregation of capitalism’s victims into groups for the purposes of deliberate 
demoralisation via regimes of psychological isolation. First, however, comes their 
semiotic fusion. As Marx (1887) explains, capitalism tends to compress the poor (e.g. in 
factories, prisons, workhouses, cramped dwellings and towns) under the watchful eye of 
supervisors and state agents. Compression (conveniently for capitalism) also facilitates an 
increase in the semiotic density of the poor – i.e. physical closeness engenders the 
blurring and cross-signification of factors such as attire, lifestyles, houses, accents, 
education, job-types, illness and work histories. When rhymed up, as discussed above, 
with iconic mass-markers, this renders poverty more easily re-presentable as a lifestyle 
choice, and not what it actually is: a lifestyle foist. Semiotic density in turn increases the 
anathattractive magnetism of a compressed group, so that even tertiary membership – e.g. 
finding oneself unemployed for the first time in decades – rapidly catches an individual in 
its gravity, accelerating the process of semiotic mergence with the anathattractive 
symbolic body. 
 When clients arrive at the Centre, they undergo a very deliberate extraction from 
their habitual cultural networks. The Centre’s procedures are firmly founded upon the 
premise that those networks must be, by definition, dysfunctional – because otherwise 
clients would be in work. “Mending” that dysfunction is believed, by the staff and the 
programme’s designers, to begin with a “tough love” forced insertion into a healthier, 
more disciplined culture. This begins with shaming, as it is felt that clients need to learn – 
indeed to come to feel – that “sponging” is unacceptable behaviour. However, the Centre 
programme never actually goes beyond this. This is not a surprise to the internees; most 
know, from previous experience of the welfare system, that they are unlikely to find any 
actually useful help here. Rather, they know – even if they do not consciously express it 
in these terms – that their role here is going to be largely performative; the Centre will 
constitute a “theatre of shame” in which staff and clients will play out a ritual blame-
game, which clients will – must – go along with in order to remain eligible for their 
benefit cheque. And simply arriving at the Centre for the first time is the first 
performance, because it is shameful in itself to have to turn up and play. However, while 
this shame-game is merely the product of the proairetic code, right from the start, when 
internees first arrive, the undercode is already emitting symbolic indications that the 
clients are by no means a random selection of dysfunctional, sponging misfits: They are 
almost all male, middle-aged and working class. Most are former tradespeople, such as 
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roofers, builders or bricklayers. Many of the internees can interpret these signs. It is clear, 
for example, that particular ages and types of people are unwanted by the labour market 
and involuntarily now surviving in dire circumstances. The staff, on some level, know 
this too – but what Macnicol (1994: 30) has described (in relation to council estates) as 
the “concentration-effect” makes it difficult for any new clients to be seen as anything but 
yet another underclass feckleme. After all, they, on the whole, share broad accents, 
manual labour backgrounds and working class language codes. And they are likely to not 
want to be here - and to very much resent the patronising proairetic ideology of the staff. 
So they share glum body language, hostile attitudes, and the behaviour of embarrassed, 
harassed beings. They also are here, obeying – so they share also what Joel Handler 
(1995: 86) has described as a state of being hostages to welfare regimes. Hostage status 
significantly affects older male or younger female claimants, as they are more likely to 
have dependants to support and much to lose if sanctioned. The outcome is that what was 
a product of the undercode – the demographic make-up of the client base – becomes, via 
the concentration-effect, fodder for the proairetic code: individuals become “them”, a 
type, to the staff. 
 This self-feeding conceit begins as soon as clients arrive. FND was a privately 
contracted payment-by-results scheme. Payment-by-results contracts have been described 
as “races-to-the-bottom”, due to bidders desperately seeking to undercut their rivals’ 
proposals (Murray, 2013). This sometimes means – as in the case of the Centre – that the 
bid made is so low that it constitutes not a race, but a suicide jump to the contract-bid 
bottom – giving a whole new meaning to “suicide bid”, because it is simply impossible to 
fulfil the contract within the proposed budget. The Centre is therefore far too small for its 
client base. A tiny kitchen, for example, is the only available waiting area, and so it is 
always crammed as internees await their next redistribution according to the Centre’s 
deliberately vague and arbitrary temporal regime. When internees first arrive at the 
Centre they are instructed by staff to “go back and wait in the kitchen. We’ll come and 
get you when we’re ready”. (Internees are also instructed to “get yourself a brew”. As 
Goffman (1961) notes, making oneself a drink is a coded signification of belonging in 
itself, as only belongers make their own drink). Internees cannot avoid reference-
contamination as they are physically compressed into this tight waiting space. When the 
staff do come to collect them, they thus find a “prole-clot”, tightly rhymed across 
multiple symbolic spectrums. Firstly, proximity: compression creates impression. 
Secondly, via clothes. Attire is one of the oldest means of rhyming individuals for 
purposes of segregation, because it is so instantly visually effective (Jewish Virtual 
Library, 2013). Clients arrive in what the Centre staff call “their home clothes” – which, 
inevitably, are often cheap and well-worn. They – the staff – view this as indicative of 
lack of client work attachment – as if home exerts such a powerful lure that clients cannot 
– yet – bear to don work attire. However, this is not work, and for many manual workers 
casual clothes are their usual working attire.  
 The prole-clot is further rhymed by age, posture, temperature, language and 
attitude. Courtesy of the UK government’s misguided bringing together of multiple social 
need-streams, a tiny fraction are homeless, and thus are unwashed, and smell. And so the 
group smells. A tiny fraction smell of alcohol, and so the group smells of alcohol. If one 
swears, the group swears. If one sweats profusely, the group sweats profusely. The heat 
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of the room accentuates the aroma. Individuals merge into a single institutional entity, 
each part of which constitutes a rhymed up fractal of the total monster. None can escape 
its anathattraction; its imposed epitaph is all for one, one for all. This monster – a 
temporary fiction of the undercode – is then delivered by prodding, breath-holding staff, 
into the aptly named induction room.  
 The induction room is a medium-sized, bare-walled office containing only cheap 
desks and chairs, and at the front of the room, standing like a monolith, a conference pad 
bearing the hand written commandments of the institution:  
1. Arrive on time.  
2. Arrive Sober – absolutely no drink or drugs.  
3. No foul or abusive language.  
4. No smoking in or around the building.  
5. Swearing, violence and aggressive behaviour towards staff will not be tolerated.  
6. Be positive at all times!  
While Staff prepare the induction paraphernalia – forms, pens and worryingly fat, pre-
collated personal information files – clients are left to meditate upon this monolith. Its 
rules are a “prole-socket”: an institutional receptor designed to fit what the underclass are 
perceived to be in bourgeois mythology; or, what is known in rhetorical studies as a 
connative code, i.e. one that constructs an idealised addressee (Eagleton, 1991). I soon 
learn, in fact, that most of the internees have long and respectable work histories.  
 The session “leader” is terrified. She has no training, being herself a low-paid 
former administration worker who would otherwise be unemployed and would rather be 
otherwise employed. Nervously, her well-rehearsed but still badly performed induction 
speech commences, as always, with: “You are here because you have failed…” It goes 
on: “…to find work in the past year…” but as internee bodies slump, hands go to faces 
like Munch’s Scream and breathing becomes audible, the trite platitudes of the proairetic 
code dissipate amidst physically visible morale-fade. You have failed is all that the 
institution really wants to say.  
 Unbelievably, a four to five hour grilling follows, prosecuted via speeches, 
harangues, intrusive forms, interrogation, pseudo-tests, embarrassment and humiliation, 
all to uncover what it is inside a client – what moral lack or psychological malfunction – 
that is causing their failure; a form of petty psychologism that might better be 
characterised as an extension of demonology and exorcism (see Danaher, et al 2000). A 
half-hour failure-lecture comes first. Internees are infanticised: (primarily) middle-aged 
people are placed back into a classroom, with desks and a teacher, perhaps for the first 
time in decades, addressed patronisingly by their first names, told how to sit and behave, 
and must ask permission to go to the toilet (permission often being refused). Stress 
positioning is deliberately employed: forcing middle-aged, working class people (the 
group most affected by the illnesses and ailments inflicted upon workers by capitalism 
(Black et al., 1990)) to endure long periods standing in corridors, sitting in uncomfortable 
chairs, hunched over computers or baking in sweltering offices. “It’s meant to be a shock 
for them,” a more experienced staff member advises me. (Cf. Klein’s (2007) examination 
of neoliberalism’s employment of the “shock doctrine”.) 
 The induction speech is followed by two hours of form-filling. Welfare 
demonology requires repetitive “data-chanting” - that is, providing the same information 
over and again in countless forms, or in person, within and through each eleemosynary 
institution attended, and at each stage of attendance (see also Herd et al., 2005). Personal 
details, work history, qualifications, experience, what jobs they would “ideally like to 
PJOS 5(2), 2013   
 
15 
 
do”, what they could “realistically” do... All of this information is already extensively 
detailed in the internees’ personal files, supplied (from previous data-chanting sessions) 
by the government welfare agency named, in literally Orwellian fashion, the Job Centre 
Plus. But now internees must chant it again.  
 The general gist of these forms is proairetic: they are designed to draw out why the 
client is unemployed and so help plot a cure. Blame (“barriers” in Centre jargon) is 
assumed to be moral: idleness, criminal records, debt, work-on-the-side – or quasi-
medical: alcoholism, psychiatric problems, depression, drug addiction, and most of all, 
low self-esteem. A major ethos of the Centre, as the manager explained to me, is to 
“identify these barriers and assist clients to overcome them”. They must, therefore, firstly 
be made to confess them. The forms demand a detailed confession of all barriers. There is 
no innocence option – that would mean leaving forms incomplete: a sanctionable offence. 
 A questionable clause in one form grants legal permission for anything an internee 
declares in these paper confessions to be passed on to “any third party” if the institution’s 
parent contractor – a major US corporation – so chooses. This astonishing demand does 
not seem legal – and probably is not. In addition, there are some here who are intoxicated 
or suffering confusion or learning difficulties. Others are merely hostages; but all are 
forced to sign this clause under aggressive threat of sanction. This adds to the general 
mortification of the internees yet another flay: a stripping of legal rights, i.e. of their 
minimum citizenship. By institutional practice, which is probably, in reality, no more 
than a time wasting exercise, internees thus become what the staff perceive them to be: 
sub-social.  
 Each week at least one person is forced to raise a hand and confess illiteracy. No 
protocol is emplaced in anticipation of this incredible embarrassment; the staff anticipate 
most of the group to be poorly literate. The illiterate too, however, must make their mark 
on the forms, dubious legal codicils and all.  
 Next, internees are required to complete a form called a “job-matcher”. This time-
waster contains around fifty phrases, including:  
I like to work with animals. I like to sing and dance on stage. I like to write. I like working with 
people. I don’t mind working at heights. I prefer to work on my own. I like working on the 
telephone. I don’t mind heavy lifting. I like to work outdoors. 
Internees must tick columns indicating how much each phrase applies to them, and then 
tot-up the columns to see which type of job they are most matched to. Of course, they 
could have just been asked what employment they preferred or were qualified to perform 
– and in fact, in a previous form just were asked. But the point of the job-matcher, at the 
proairetic level, is to imply that people might be workless because they are confused 
about what they want to do, or because they are applying for employment which does not 
match their skills and experience. The results border absurdity. Some internees are 
advised to consider jobs such as zoo worker, actor or writer, while former bricklayers, 
roofers, and lorry drivers find, wryly, that they are best suited to work as bricklayers, 
roofers or drivers.  
 Another form asks if the client would like help disclosing a criminal record. Those 
who tick yes are advised simply never to mention it to an employer. Similarly, those with 
no qualifications or experiences are told to make them up, as “no one will ever check”. 
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 At the undercode level, however, the point of these forms is simply to waste time: a 
certain amount of client contact hours must be contractually fulfilled, but real 
employment training is fantastically beyond the budget of a workfare centre, hence, such 
institutions are structurally groomed to engage in time wasting. The information in these 
forms is mostly never referred to again, beyond this day.  
 Isolated incidents of mortification resistance do occur, such as arguments, refusals 
and protests. Staff use these as a disciplinary weapon: trouble makers who are kind 
enough to identify themselves are made examples of, either by dismissal from the Centre 
(a direct route to a sanction) or by being threatened into silence. Internees who make 
reasonable requests to leave early to collect children from school are refused permission. 
They are then forced to ask for permission to use their own mobile phones to arrange last-
minute child care. Staff cynically employ the control protocol that the humiliation of one 
is the humiliation of all, recommending its practice to new staff members.  
 Next, the group is subjected to a computerised psychometric intelligence checker, 
regardless of extant qualifications – and regardless of ability to use computers. Those 
with little computer experience are thus made to appear stupid. The results of this test are 
regularly referred to from this point; they go right at the front of a client’s manual file, 
and dictate their perceived level of training and support need.  
 After two to three hours of induction, just as the group begins to reach the limits of 
patience and threaten to coagulate into solidaristic resistance, the institution plays its 
trump card: it ominously disaggregates the internees, marching them in cohorts of five 
into a claustrophobic office for their first “case worker interview”. These onerous “culpa 
session” interrogations (Goffman, 1961), where internees are pushed to explain their 
failed state (a micro-fractal of imperialist neoliberal warmongering ideology), constitute a 
powerful negative individuality experience, with five separate mortifications occurring 
consecutively within the same room. Goffman (1990) argues that the stigmatised are 
acutely alive to the possibility of embarrassing disclosure leaks in any social setting, and 
that this is itself a psychologically stressful state. At the Centre, however, mortificatory 
disclosure is unstoppable as “information spills” occur regularly: files left open revealing 
intimate information, CVs stored openly on public computers, obnoxiously loud phone 
calls about you, personal details left on notes and computer screens, inevitable gossip and 
sharing of data, and, worst of all, the very public and open discussion of one’s most 
personal problems. Staff call out to one another across the room, over the internees they 
are discussing: “How long is someone on the sex offender’s register for?” “What’s the 
number for Alcoholics Anonymous?” Just as films have non-diagetic sounds, that the 
characters cannot hear, so staff communicate with one another as if the clients are unable 
to hear themselves being spoken over in this way. Not only is this profoundly 
embarrassing in itself, but, according to Goffman (1961), witnessing the demeaning of 
others in your cohort is itself psychologically mortifying.  
 Suitably softened up by hours of physical and psychological stress-positioning, the 
internees now find out what the panopticon has evolved into in the neoliberal age: the 
disciplinary interview. It is sometimes forgotten (due to its foucauldian overuse) that the 
panopticon, although in part a horrific poor-house fantasia (Bentham, 1791), was 
envisioned not simply to watch, but to psychologically affect as a disciplinary technique 
(ibid.). Surveillance is merely watching; to have an “observer effect”, it must push 
oppressively upon the watched, creating dread. But in a mass surveillance society, 
“dread-fade” is inevitable, as populations come – to some degree - to psychologically 
adapt to scrutiny. In such a regime, watching must again become physical and present in 
order to “dread-up” the experience. Disciplinary interviews punctuate their victim’s lives 
with inescapable ritual denigrations. The point is not so much the denigrations 
themselves, but how cheaply (undercode imperative) and effectively they fill the days in 
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between them with waiting-dread (cf. Kafka, 1953). This onerous temporal regime 
attacks morale and corrodes social agency via a “looming effect”. For the looming effect 
to work, however, the interviews must be dreaded. Signing-on at the job centre or 
attending a workfare caseworker interview are actually meaningless in content; it is their 
psycho-positioning in time that matters.  
 The Centre’s interview room is all about dread. It is structured to situationally strip 
internees: while staff are seated in comfortable office chairs, obscured behind tables, 
bristling pen-cups, computer screens, and administration detritus, internees squirm at the 
side of the desk in cheap plastic seats, their whole poor body rendered naked to official – 
and room – scrutiny in a shame-theatre for one. Internees sit in silence, or emit awkward 
chit-chat. Staff face their computer screens, choosing when to look at or address the 
client. Even the control of eye, and human, contact is thus embedded in office layout.  
 A computer generated semi-structured interview is used for this interrogation – and 
answers are recorded digitally, and sent to the Centre’s parent contractor in the United 
States for further analysis, and in time, instructions.  
 The interview questions are another prole-socket, beginning, always, with “Why 
are you unemployed?” This and subsequent questions are intended to inject the venom of 
the bourgeois ideology of personal failure into each internee’s self-consciousness. The 
capitalist episteme is incapable of articulating a reason why an able-bodied person would 
be unemployed. It can only view them as a feckleme (see Mead, 1986; Gilder, 1982). One 
interviewer takes pleasure in forcing clients to relate their entire average day to him. Any 
time not spent job-searching is then highlighted as unacceptable idleness.  
 To the staff, this process of ideological inoculation (against structural 
consciousness
6
) appears like medicine. As Goffman (1990) explains, the stigmatised are 
often groomed by experience into concocting pseudo-perspectives on their predicaments 
that fit wider social expectations. So while some internees do offer mortification 
resistance, many others scramble awkwardly to offer an explanation of their 
unemployment which falls in with the proairetic code. Debt, alcoholism, drug use, ill 
health, poverty, depression, family breakdown, hopelessness – all of which could be 
caused by unemployment, rather than be causes of it – become vocalised as awkward 
“troubles” which are then discursively, and dubiously, elided with employment status. 
Elision itself elides, falsely, but with inevitability, into causation. However, the moment 
the internee capitulates in this way, they become immediately hooked into the 
institution’s “looping” (Goffman, 1961) ideology: these admissions are seen by the 
interrogator as a breakthrough, and more and more probing questions are levelled to 
attempt to make the client draw out and face (exorcise) their barrier (demon). The 
                                                          
6 According to Marxist theory, poverty and unemployment in industrial capitalism are, by and large, the 
products of economic processes operating at the macro-structural level. This is in contrast to arguments that 
indigence is primarily the product of individual lack of effort. The Marxist theory of false consciousness 
proposes that individuals can be distracted from the realities of structural poverty by being ideologically 
indoctrinated to believe that poverty is self-caused.   
 
   J. Jordan 
internee, in turn, is forced to continue to build their story, giving the interrogator precisely 
what they want to hear. The story “pools” – growing bigger and bigger – and the 
interrogator falsely perceives this as getting deeper and deeper into the internee’s 
dysfunctional psyche and lifestyle. And then at the end, the charade collapses. The staff 
are only playing at being social nurses; in truth they are cheap, ex-admin workers, and 
their only profferable solution is trite advice: “Well try to get out more, that’ll cheer you 
up.” “Try to spend less, that’ll save some money.”  
 From now on, these disciplinary interviews – which last around twenty minutes - 
will occur every two weeks. At each interview, the internee is expected to have 
progressed in overcoming their barriers. If not, the looping occurs again – internees have 
to spill more guilt on themselves, going further into pooling a picture of dysfunction to 
feed the expectations of the case worker. The longer this charade goes on, the more it 
seems that the barrier-demon is real – after all, so the proairetic ideology suggests, if it 
wasn’t, they’d be in work, wouldn’t they? 
 Next, the internees begin six weeks of “training”. All of the usual welfare time-
fillers are employed in the Centre’s training regime: CVs, covering letters and interview 
techniques. Most training, however, is intimate. Hygiene is highly emphasised: one must 
wash properly and clean one’s teeth: “Body odour annoys co-workers and bad breath puts 
off potential employers”. This training is not simply delivered, however: internees self-
mortify by being forced to offer suggestions - and they build the list that is then written 
onto the white-board: 
Taking a shower. Washing armpits. Using deodorant. Cleaning teeth. Wear clean clothes and 
underwear. Iron your clothes. Wear a tie. Don’t slouch. Don’t swear. Speak clearly and politely. 
Don’t be aggressive. Don’t be racist. No sexual touching. 
 Outlook is covered too. Life-coaching sessions encourage positive thinking. 
Positive words are collated on the whiteboard. Positivity is compulsory – an indicator, 
argues Goffman (1961), of a total institution.  
 However, despite the obnoxious morale-corrosion engendered by such training, the 
most onerous aspect of the Centre’s regime is something else, something that does not 
last as long but is more intense: the psycho-physical stress positioning known as job-
search. These sessions involve a prole-clot of around twelve clients crammed into a tiny, 
humid computer room, forced to repetitively trawl the Government’s jobs.gov website, 
reviewing the same, mostly long expired vacancies, over and over, under the close 
supervision of a staff member. This includes many internees with no computer skills, 
some with poor or even no English, some illiterate, and in my time, at least one who was 
clinically blind. 
 If clients complain that there are no jobs, they are met with the Devil’s arithmetic. 
This states that there are two hundred thousand jobs on the jobs.gov website, and only one 
of you. But that list is for the whole country. In fact, there are many of you for every 
vacancy, and you are by no means top of the wanted list. Many of the vacancies, in fact, 
are bogus: commission-only sales, or tricks to harvest job-seeker details for data to sell, 
or to swell employment agency rolls. 
 All of this, however, becomes progressively moot. The centre makes money when 
clients are gotten back into sustainable work. The clients are not getting back into any 
work, because the labour market does not want them. The Centre is not, therefore, 
making any money. However, there is another possible source of income. When clients 
are referred to the Centre – which means no more than that the Job Centre Plus enrols 
them on a computer system and sends over a corresponding bundle of documents – the 
Centre attracts a small “referral payment” (DWP, 2009). The anthropologist Claude Levi-
Strauss (1961: 287) reports that the Brazilian Nambikwara people, although much 
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preferring meat, often find themselves forced to survive instead upon “grasshopper pie” – 
grasshoppers always being readily available. Similarly, the Centre begins to survive on 
the grasshopper pie of referral fees, not the meat of job outcomes. This means that they 
need as many grasshoppers as possible. The Centre thus begins to accept as many client 
referrals as are offered – and is soon, according to the manager, receiving fifty to eighty 
new ones every week - all of whom need to be processed, interviewed and trained - for a 
period of one year in this tiny office. The Centre is overwhelmed. There is a locked 
storeroom containing mail-bags full of unopened referral letters – i.e. people who are on 
the system, who have attracted a referral payment, but who have never been called in 
even for an induction. A substantial ambition-fade occurs. Over a period of weeks, as 
client numbers reached institutionally catastrophic proportions, training dropped from a 
compulsory six weeks, to four weeks, to two, to two days a week, to, by the time I left, 
only if they really need it. This is the undercode, pushing an inevitable breakdown; but 
capitalism-proper has always done this - and always retrieves from this a dialectic 
engendering of the next phasal mode of pauper exploitation. In other words, FND served 
its purpose as the storage phase of the industrial reserve army cycle, compressing the 
victims of structural unemployment into a disciplinary prole-clot and consequent 
anathattractive state, viciously defamed by media, political and even academic discourse. 
FND’s inevitable failure, which was not caused by client resistance, idleness or 
dysfunction, but by simple economic realities, then groomed class-racist calls for a much 
harsher disciplinary re-socialisation of the feckleme underclass: preferably in forced 
work-for-benefits schemes (see National Audit Office, 2012). 
 
6.   Concluding discussion 
6.1.   The anathattractive s/State, prole-control and the workfare dialectic 
The fear that the numbers of prolemes might expand and infect real society was 
aggressively exploited by New Labour via its social exclusion rhetoric (Cameron and 
Palan, 2004; Byrne, 2005) – a fiction cynically deployed to mask the capital exclusion 
engendered by neoliberalism. This feckleme tale generated and intensified council estates 
as anathattractive sites, so that condemnation to grinding poverty became semiotically re-
signified into a dysfunctional life choice; a neat, fast-breeding fusion of undercode and 
semio-ideology. This symbiotic, semiotic conspiracy downloads into all of the 
apparatuses of state-neoliberalist prole-control: courts, prisons, probation offices, asylum-
seeker centres, housing authorities, social work offices, job centres – and workfare poor-
houses. Each such apparatus, however, is constructed to manage a peculiar brand of 
proleme, adapting its semio-regime accordingly. 
 “Brand” is used consciously here to mean the creation of a brand through branding 
– a literal fate, in the past, for many paupers (Marx, 1887: 515). Historically, the problem 
with paupers (for capitalism) is that the difference between them and the lowest paid 
workers is rarely financial (Spicker, 1984; Digby, 1989) – a fact still in evidence, for 
example, when it is argued in disgust that some benefits claimants earn as much in 
welfare as full-time workers do in wages (see Cameron, 2013). Seen rightly, this actually 
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means that some workers earn merely benefits level wages; a shocking reality which 
poses a powerful challenge to the ideology that work lifts people out of poverty (see e.g. 
Gilder, 1982). To mask this inconvenient discrepancy, and to neutralise it as a rallying 
point for anti-capitalists, an imaginary moral difference is constructed between the 
deserving poor and the fecklemes via media, academic and political anathematisation 
(Marx, 1887). An imaginary moral lack, however, necessarily has no physical 
manifestation. Achieving an effective- and affective – foregrounding of paupers as 
individual failures therefore requires marking; or what came to be known in poor-law 
practice as “badging”. Although darkly ironic, disappearing structural poverty is regularly 
achieved by constructing, and radically foregrounding, the feckleme. 
 The literal badging of paupers under capitalist regimes began in the 15
th
 century 
(Spicker, 1984) – and this continues, for example, in making workfare victims wear 
orange tabards as they clean streets (Piven and Cloward, 2001). However, as Bentham 
knew – indeed recommended (Spicker, 1984) – badging can occur via other means. One 
such important means is displaying paupers in shame-theatres, such as stocks, labour-
yards, work-schemes/placements, workhouses (Marx, 1887; Burnett, 1994), newspapers 
(Atkinson, 2013), published claimant rolls (Littlewood, 2013) – and workfare centres. 
Noting the almost total failure (in fiscal and job-outcome terms) of European workfare, 
Bret (2003) wonders what its rationale could possibly be. There are some important 
economic answers to this, as Peck (2001) and Jessop (1993) have demonstrated, such as 
super-exploitation
7
 and labour discipline. But on another systemic level, workfare’s 
purpose is to badge its victims: to symbolically sculpt them into underclass fecklemes and 
so download into them the blame for neoliberal globalisation’s failures – and then to 
stock them in shame-theatres for ritual castigation. There is also some sense of magical 
panic here – of terrible, impotent fears, of approaching, hostile, almost supernatural 
market “forces”. And so, much as ancient South American tyrannies might have 
attempted to repel a plague by desperately slaughtering captives in grim stone temples 
(another form of horrific social art), so the economic plague of neoliberalism is addressed 
by tormenting individuals in grim workfare centres.  
 The real-konstruktion of a workfare centre, however, is not simply the product of 
class-racist Benthamite malefactors. These malicious social architects are lurking, but 
more is at play. Three key streams evolve into a workfare centre: the disciplining of the 
victims of poverty, their semiotic denigration, and the basic logistics of running a cheap 
prole-control apparatus. Although often overlooked (perhaps due to its lack of analytic 
glamour) the most important of these is the latter. Every prole-control apparatus will, with 
dull inevitability, adapt to its budget. The neoliberal undercode, however – particularly 
the quasi-religious faith in marketisation (Harvey, 2011) – is not so much a dull, as a 
dullard compulsion. It eggs-on suicide bid franchises that have little hope of breaking-
even without breaking the rules. And payment-by-results constitutes the most vexatious 
of all (neoliberal) greed-dreams. Such cargo cult contracts, applied to welfare, cannot 
long resist the sharp reality-slap of the structural causes of unemployment. Failure in 
terms of job outcomes is inevitable, short of enforced slavery (cf. DWP, 2012) or an 
economic upturn (see Peck, 2001). Referral fees, intended to tide-over a centre until the 
magic cargo materialises, merely vitiate the moral hazard of client loading, i.e. of taking 
on more clients than the centre can handle, just to provide a grasshopper pie income.
 Training, and the other two workfare con-words, help and support, are laughable 
                                                          
7 “Super-exploitation” is the process of extracting much higher than average surplus labour value from 
workers (see Mandel, 1971 for an excellent explanation). 
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euphemisms for, at best, time-wasting, and at worst, class-racist social re-education. Such 
a situation, however, is not a spontaneously generated shambles but the product of deeply 
unhealthy dialectic. That a workfare franchise has even been taken on indicates that the 
proairetic code had already permeated executive perceptions: Without the pathologising 
conceit that the unemployed are fecklemes, who, with disciplinary re-socialisation could 
be re-inserted into the job market, there is no business rationale for payment-by-results 
workfare. The horrific social art side-project of neoliberalism – to semiotically sculpt its 
victims into an anathattractive state – is thus not a creation of workfare centres, or 
prejudiced staff, but indicative of a wider socially miasmatic illusion.  
 This illusion emerges as a twisted ideology, parasitic upon the ongoing material 
reality of capital exclusion (Miliband, 1989; Westergaard, 1995). The primary site of 
semiotic class struggle is the process of poverty itself: The semiotic border between the 
wealthy and the very poor is very real, courtesy of an axiomatically grossly uneven 
distribution of options, commodities and services. When, as under neoliberalism, a 
privileged elite actively appropriate for themselves an ever greater share of social wealth, 
that border shrinks back around them. It may even take on proportions of obscenity – i.e. 
the trappings of plutocratic hyper-wealth contrasted with starvation poverty. This process 
lends itself to an awakened materialist consciousness – but also to a counter-revolutionary 
ideological parasitisation: Rather than an ongoing project of aggressive capital 
withdrawal, it is possible to pretend that it is the poor who are, by the vice of their own 
laziness and dysfunction, expanding like a cancer. This is the class-racist illusion that 
downloads into a workfare centre. But with this conceit comes also – indeed first - its 
material, dialectic base: capital exclusion. The capillary withdrawal of wealth from social 
welfare axiomatically renders prole-control a minimum-budget project. The neoliberal 
counter-revolution thus evolves fractiously within the hothouse of a workfare centre. 
Staff soon learn, for example, that client dressage does not lead to employment. The only 
source of job-purpose and self-worth which staff can retain after this grim epiphany is to 
engage in the fantasy of being social nurses fighting the good fight on the front line of the 
struggle to cure fecklemes of their social sickness. Thus, a meaningless, pointless 
workfare scheme becomes psychologically transubstantiated into an institutional 
mythology of giving the clients structure and discipline. The content of delivery becomes 
irrelevant. Job-outcomes become irrelevant. Pedagogy and dressage themselves become 
self-purposing (cf. Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Foucault, 1991). Indeed, the more 
pointless, menial, repetitive and demoralising the activity the better, because this is seen 
as at least preparing internees for the comparable conditions of menial labour - as if 
making the unemployed perform work-like activities might, via sympathetic magic, 
attract a job.  
 The undercode, however, rolls on with dull enthusiasm. Cheap prole-control, 
prosecuted via forced prole-clots and corresponding regimes of class-racist dressage, 
inevitably prompts the dialectical emergence of a new systemic worry: resistance. The 
agency of individuals can be conceived of as what Georg Simmel characterises as spheres 
of effective social action (Manning, 1992). Spatial compression of the poor thus carries 
with it the danger of a coagulation of these spheres into a tightly-knit and therefore 
potentially politically effective “social foam”: i.e. strikers, rioters, revolutionary fronts, 
unions, political parties, gangs, alliances, criminal organisations, close communities, 
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resistance or even guerrilla organisations. Hence, just as neoliberalism eliminates 
structure discursively, so also does its application evolve to eliminate proletarian union 
practically by developing special kinds of apparatus-regimes in which the poor can be 
corralled in a way that prevents the formation of any such effective foamal structures. By 
creating regimes of internal terrorism, i.e. frightening, isolating, individualising, psycho-
quarantining practices, individual spheres of agency can be punctured and deflated. 
Miliband (1974), for instance, notes the powerfully depoliticising, hope-draining 
properties of welfare. Neoliberal workfare is an acute extension and intensification of this 
agency deflation effect, prosecuted on an institutional basis against the sufferers of 
poverty. One sees this physically in a workfare centre in the deflated body language of its 
victims. Thus deflated, groups can be held in a state of “sloppy foam”: that is, in states 
unconducive to a coagulation into effective unions of resistance – or what I label a 
negative individualisation experience. As the agency of the internees further deflates 
under the weight of corroded morale, the staff continue to perceive instead low self-
esteem – not recognising that it is workfare itself that adds the personally intolerable to 
the structurally unbearable. And so the regime of class-racist psychologism and self-
deluding social nurse fantasies self-justifies and repeats.  
 To say what, precisely, is the point of all of this requires some careful 
disambiguation. Workfare is a fractious, changeable policy, the ultimate outcome of 
which may be varied and contradictory. Purpose, in this sense, needs to be mapped as far 
as possible in real time, or post facto, in order to maintain a grip on workfare’s active 
dialectic responsiveness to changing material and ideological factors. This is where many 
studies of workfare drift awry; workfare is not one destination in itself, such as super-
exploitation or social imprisonment. It is, rather, at one and the same time, the train ride 
to the destination and the means by which its passengers are made to seem like they really 
belong wherever they are being sent. To achieve this illusion, it is not really ideology that 
is deployed so much as what Habermas (1976: 15) has described as “not-learning” – i.e. 
the cynical disruption of coherent thought. The masterpiece of not-learning is the concept 
of the underclass – not so much the word, which is merely a twisted signifier, but its 
implication of a cellular plural. Via this term, the structural root of poverty is aggressively 
downloaded into its victims, and then, by legerdemain, transubstantiated into them, as 
people, courtesy of mythologies of personal dysfunction. Process becomes people – an 
act of rhetorical magic, complete with its own fairy-tale characters: fecklemes. Fecklemes 
become blame sponges, swelling semiotically as all aspects of their life become re-
signified into attractors of opprobrium – an anathattractive state. Physical compression 
via economic processes and state apparatuses, and discursive compression via class-racist 
discourse, then merges these swollen sponges via mendacious social rhyming. The 
victims of poverty are thus made to appear as a culture – almost as an ethnicity with 
shared (dysfunctional) mores. This has to happen because structural poverty is massive, 
and so laundering it into simple individual dysfunction could never mask the sheer scale 
of it. For the laundering to work, individual dysfunction has to be – somehow – scaled 
back up to the size of the real problem. The genius of the capitalist episteme is to solve 
this by simply eliminating the coherent distinction between individual, plural and process 
via the concept of the dysfunctional underclass. Individual anathattractive states are thus 
amalgamated into the Anathattractive State (the underclass) a social cancer, each cell of 
which is re-signified to appear as the fractal carrier of an entire cultural pathology.  
 This transubstantiation of processes into people is a Devil’s arithmetic which 
cannot be captured as a coherent thought, but only by such. It requires its own sign: The 
Anathattractive s/State. This signifies the illusion via which secondment to an individual 
anathattractive state is simultaneously one’s re-signification into a metonymic fractal of a 
mythical filth-column State.  
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 Where this project is heading is open to question. Marx (1975b) notes that 
capitalist ideology falsely fractures perceptions of society to create the illusion of 
differential social limbs which thus appear systemically unconnected, and thriving 
according to their own internal circulatory systems. The Anathattractive s/State is a step 
beyond, to a deliberately prosecuted alien limb syndrome, in which the victims of 
structural poverty are transformed into a diseased extremity. This, as Wright (1997) has 
rightly pointed out, is a dangerous conceit which, in time, might even lead to calls for 
amputation.  
6.2.   Programmatic implications 
This paper reiterates the importance of accounting for the grooming effects economic 
processes have on micro-level symbolism. It particularly highlights the dialectic interplay 
between mundane economic imperatives – such as low budgets – and glib class-racism in 
fields associated with the current cultural folk-devil “the underclass”. In contrast to many 
previous studies of “welfare reform”, which have tended to present workfare solely in 
terms of the mass flexibilisation of labour, this paper foregrounds the active and 
performative nature of symbolic defamation, showing how individuals come to “play out” 
the role of “feckless unemployed” simply to survive the very processes putatively set in 
place to “help and support” them back into work. This approach provides a programmatic 
basis for future explorations of how massive economic events can, in certain institutions, 
be hypostatised into micro-physical symbolism.  
 
6.3.   Post-Script 
When FND was cancelled in 2010, it had achieved a success rate (that is people gotten 
back into work) of 5.6 percent (Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion 2012: 1). That 
is, in layperson’s terms, a 95 percent failure rate. New Labour, in other words, did not 
create much new labour. FND was replaced by the Conservative/Liberal-Democrat 
coalition’s Work Programme in 2011 – an almost identical scheme, but for the name. The 
expansion of the reserve labour army in order to boost profit continues to be a primary 
objective of the neoliberal project.  
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